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I. INTRODUCTION1
Linda Zagzebski’s Epistemic Authority is an expansive book, exploring 
a  range of issues from the nature of the self, agency, and trust, to the 
problems of epistemic circularity and peer disagreement. The heart of 
the book, however, that which ties all of these disparate topics together, 
is an exploration and defence of the idea that there is such a  thing as 
genuinely epistemic authority, a  kind of authority over belief that 
genuinely parallels practical authority, or authority over action. Insofar 
as the topic of authority is a  central concern of social and political 
philosophers, it is surprising that this topic has received relatively little 
attention from social epistemologists. Zagzebski’s book goes a long way 
towards rectifying this situation, and as such it will undoubtedly serve as 
a touchstone for future work.
Zagzebski’s account of epistemic authority is formulated so as to parallel 
what can safely be called the standard contemporary account of practical 
authority, Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority.2 According to 
Raz, practical authorities perform the service of mediating between 
agents and the reasons for action that apply to them. Authorities perform 
this service by issuing directives, such as laws, orders, or commands, that 
provide agents with reasons for action that are supposed to both reflect 
and replace the reasons for action that apply to these agents independent 
of the directive. Raz calls such reasons for action ‘pre-emptive’ reasons. 
The notion of pre-emption is supposed to explain the intuitive respect in 
which practical authorities purport to be in a position to settle for us the 
1 I am indebted to Linda Zagzebski for many discussions of this material, as well as to 
the comments of an anonymous referee.
2 The canonical statement of this position is Raz (1986).
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question what to do. For Raz, authorities settle practical questions for us 
by giving us pre-emptive reasons for action.
Following Raz, Zagzebski states that what is essential to authority is 
the normative power to generate pre-emptive reasons, and she holds that 
such normative powers can be powers to generate pre-emptive reasons 
for belief just as much as for action.
What is essential to authority is that it is a  normative power that 
generates reasons for others to do or believe something preemptively ... 
A preemptive reason is a reason that replaces other reasons the subject 
has. Believing what another person believes or tells me preemptively 
is parallel to doing what he tells me to do preemptively. In both cases 
what the authority does gives me reason to believe or do something 
that replaces my other reasons relevant to the belief or act. (Zagzebski 
2012: 102)3
Raz himself seems to accept that there can be epistemic authority that 
meets the general conditions of his service conception. In a recent paper 
he writes:
Just as with any practical authority, the point of theoretical authority is to 
enable me to conform to reason, this time reason for belief, better than 
I would otherwise be able to do. This requires taking the expert advice 
and allowing it to pre-empt my own assessment of the evidence. If I do 
not do that, I do not benefit from it. (Raz 2009: 155)
Raz here claims that ‘expert advice’ can provide pre-emptive reasons for 
belief. I take it that what Raz calls expert advice is what epistemologists 
would call expert testimony, for example, a  climate scientist’s telling 
me that global warming is occurring and is largely the result of human 
activity. Raz is claiming that such testimony can provide pre-emptive 
reasons for belief and that agents like the climate scientist thus amount 
to epistemic (or theoretical) authorities.
Interestingly, however, Zagzebski’s initial cases of epistemic authority 
are not cases of expert or authoritative testimony. Zagzebski’s initial 
defence of epistemic authority in Chapter 5 of her book concerns the 
authority of belief, not testimony. It concerns cases in which I trust the 
way in which someone else gets her belief in a particular domain more 
that I trust the way in which I would get the belief myself. As she puts it, 
3 In a similar vein, Lawlor (2013) argues that the speech act of assurance purports to 
provide hearers with exclusionary or pre-emptive reasons for belief. I argue for a similar 
parallel between testimony and authoritative practical directives in McMyler (2011).
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‘In cases of these kinds the conscientious thing to do is to let the other 
person stand in for me in my attempt to get the truth in that domain 
and to adopt his belief. This in broad outline is what I mean by epistemic 
authority.’ (2012: 105) Zagzebski notes that this is not the most natural 
parallel to the case of practical authority. She claims that the authority 
of testimony, the topic of Chapter 6, is a stronger form of authority that 
more closely resembles authority over action (2012: 119). Nevertheless, 
she thinks that the authority of belief bears sufficient resemblance 
to practical authority for it to count as a  genuine form of authority. 
Zagzebski thus proposes that there are two general types of epistemic 
authority, the authority of belief and the authority of testimony, both 
of which deserve to be characterized as forms of authority in virtue 
of their being normative powers to generate for others pre-emptive 
reasons for belief.
I think that Zagzebski is right that there is such a thing as epistemic 
authority, where this is understood as a  kind of authority over belief 
that robustly parallels authority over action. With this much agreement 
in mind, however, I want to raise three worries concerning the details 
of Zagzebski’s account, all of which bear on her central contention 
that epistemic authority is a normative power to generate pre-emptive 
reasons for belief. First, it is difficult to see how Zagzebski’s account of 
the authority of belief meets the conditions that Raz proposes on the 
possession of a normative power. If authority is a normative power over 
others, and if we accept Raz’s conception of the nature of normative 
powers, then it is difficult to see how there can be such a thing as the 
authority of belief. This is not a problem for Zagzebski’s account of the 
authority of testimony. However, second, if we accept Raz’s conception 
of the nature of pre-emptive reasons, it is difficult to see how there can 
be such a thing as a pre-emptive reason for belief. Raz holds that pre-
emptive reasons are a species of what he calls ‘second-order reasons’, but 
given the nature of second-order reasons, I don’t see how there can be 
reasons that are epistemically second-order. This is a problem for both 
Zagzebski’s account of the authority of testimony and her account of the 
authority of belief. Finally, third, even if we can make sense of the notion 
of pre-emptive epistemic reasons, it isn’t clear that the normative power 
to give pre-emptive reasons is actually sufficient for authority. This is 
a  problem for the Razian framework for understanding authority in 
general, be it epistemic or practical. I end on a positive note, suggesting 
that Zagzebski’s discussion of the authority of testimony points to 
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considerations that take us beyond the official Razian framework for 
understanding authority, considerations that might be employed to 
address the second and third problems outlined here.
II. BELIEF AND NORMATIVE POWER
As I  have said, Zagzebski’s initial defence of epistemic authority in 
Chapter 5 concerns the authority of belief. Generally speaking, another’s 
belief is authoritative for me when I  conscientiously trust the way in 
which the other gets her belief more than I  would the way in which 
I would get my own belief were I to attempt to determine what to believe 
myself. In such cases, Zagzebski claims that the reasonable thing to do 
is to let the authority ‘stand in for me’ in determining what to believe, 
and I do this by allowing the authority’s judgment to pre-empt my own. 
She formulates this in terms of the following pre-emption thesis for 
epistemic authority:
The fact that the authority has a belief p is a reason for me to believe p 
that replaces my other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply 
added to them. (2012: 107)
Zagzebski is aware that this does not directly parallel Raz’s account of 
practical authority, but I think it is worth pausing a moment to see why. 
Consider in this respect what a parallel pre-emption thesis for practical 
authority might look like:
The fact that the authority Φs (or intends to Φ) is a reason for me to Φ 
(or intend to Φ) that replaces my other reasons relevant to Φ-ing (or 
intending to Φ) and is not simply added to them.
This is not Raz’s pre-emption thesis. Raz’s pre-emption thesis for practical 
authority is instead something like the following:
The fact that an authority directs (commands, orders, tells) me to Φ is 
a reason for me to Φ that replaces my other reasons relevant to Φ-ing 
and is not simply added to them.4
4 Raz writes, ‘One thesis I  am arguing for claims that authoritative reasons are 
preemptive: the fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its 
performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to 
do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them.’ (1986: 46) I have formulated 
the pre-emption thesis in the text in the first-person in order to parallel Zagzebski’s pre-
emption thesis. Note that on Raz’s formulation, the notion of an authority’s ‘requiring 
performance’, or as I put it above, directing me to Φ, is integral to the account.
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Raz holds that practical authority is a matter of the way in which the 
directives of authorities are capable of providing pre-emptive reasons for 
action. Zagzebski’s pre-emption thesis for epistemic authority does not 
require the issuing of directives, and as a result, I doubt that it amounts 
to something that is rightly referred to as a kind of authority.
Note that the practical parallel of Zagzebski’s pre-emption thesis 
does not characterize cases of practical authority. I might very well treat 
someone that I  admire as an  exemplar concerning which actions to 
perform in a given domain without thereby treating her as a practical 
authority. For example, I might seek to emulate my neighbour’s gardening 
techniques, or the intentions involved therein, without thereby treating 
my neighbour as having any practical authority over me. In emulating 
my neighbour, I am not obeying her, and this is because she hasn’t told 
me to do anything. So if the practical parallel of Zagzebski’s pre-emption 
thesis doesn’t characterize cases of practical authority, why should we 
think that the epistemic version characterizes something that deserves 
to be called authority?
One might suggest that epistemic and practical authority simply 
differ in this regard. I take it that this is roughly Zagzebski’s view. Along 
these lines, one might suggest that in seeking to emulate my neighbour’s 
gardening techniques I am in fact treating her as an epistemic authority. 
After all, her actions express her beliefs about what is to be done 
gardening-wise, and if I conscientiously trust those beliefs more than 
I would my own beliefs were I to attempt to determine what to do for 
myself, then I might treat the beliefs that are expressed in her actions as 
pre-emptive reasons for belief. Zagzebski herself describes a case very 
much like this as a case of epistemic authority: ‘I may want to attend 
a lecture but might not be sure where the lecture room is. I may then 
follow a group of people whom I know are going to the lecture. I assume 
that their behaviour indicates their belief about the location of the 
room, and when I do so, it is their belief that I take to be authoritative.’ 
(2012: 120)
I  think there is reason to resist construing such cases as cases of 
genuine authority. Recall that Zagzebski accepts Raz’s conception 
of authority as a  normative power to generate for others pre-emptive 
reasons. As she recognizes, having what one says or does treated as a pre-
emptive reason is insufficient for possession of such a normative power. 
Immediately after introducing Raz’s account of authority as normative 
power, she writes:
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I am not suggesting that taking a reason to be preemptive is sufficient for 
either acting or believing on authority. If you love someone, you might 
take the fact that he or she asks you to do something as a preemptive 
reason to do it, but when you do so you are not treating the beloved 
as an  authority. Similarly, it is possible (although less likely), that you 
will take the fact that the loved one has a certain belief as a preemptive 
reason to believe it. If so, believing preemptively is not sufficient for 
believing on authority. We usually do not think that the people we love 
have a normative power to give us preemptive reasons just because we 
love them, even if we choose to take their wishes as giving us preemptive 
reasons. In contrast, authority is such a power. (Zagzebski 2012: 102-103)
Zagzebski here claims that we might rationally or justifiably treat a loved 
one’s request (or belief) as a  pre-emptive reason for action (or belief) 
without this making the loved one a practical (or epistemic) authority. 
Treating what another does or believes pre-emptively is insufficient 
for the person’s possessing a normative power to generate pre-emptive 
reasons for others. What more, then, is required for possession of such 
a normative power?
In Practical Reason and Norms, Raz gives the following definition of 
normative power:
An  act is the exercise of a  normative power if, and only if, it is 
recognized as effecting a  normative change because, among other 
possible justifications, it is an act of a type that, if recognized as effecting 
a normative change, acts of this type will be generally performed only 
if the persons concerned want to secure this normative change. (Raz 
1999: 103)5
There are two things to note about this definition. First, this definition 
presupposes that the exercise of a  normative power is an  act, 
an  intentional action. For Raz, to exercise the normative power to 
give pre-emptive reasons is, paradigmatically, to order, command, or 
legislate that someone do something. No such actions are present in the 
case of my neighbour or Zagzebski’s pedestrians. My neighbour has not 
directed me to do or believe anything, and neither have the pedestrians 
in Zagzebski’s example.
But perhaps Raz’s definition needs to be modified in order to make 
room for epistemic authority. Perhaps another person’s believing that 
5 See also Raz (1979: 18).
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p in  a  way that is conscientiously recognized by me as being more 
conscien tious than would be my own belief were I  to try to form the 
belief myself is sufficient for possessing the relevant normative epistemic 
power. We might thus try to modify Raz’s definition of normative power 
by replacing talk of acts and performing actions with talk of beliefs and 
holding beliefs:
A  belief is the exercise of a  normative power if, and only if, it is 
recognized as effecting a  normative change because, among other 
possible justifications, it is a belief of a type that, if recognized as effecting 
a normative change, beliefs of this type will generally be held only if the 
persons concerned want to secure this normative change.
Second, however, not only does Raz’s definition of normative power 
presume that exercises of normative powers are intentional actions, it 
also holds that these actions must be of a type that are typically performed 
in order to secure a normative change, in the case of authority, in order 
to give to or generate for others pre-emptive reasons. Orders and 
commands are speech acts that are issued with the intention of giving or 
generating pre-emptive reasons. This is what distinguishes such exercises 
of normative power from other speech acts, like requests, that might be 
rationally treated as providing pre-emptive reasons but that are not issued 
with the intention of doing so. Neither my neighbour’s gardening beliefs 
nor the pedestrian’s beliefs concerning the location of the lecture are held 
in order to generate pre-emptive reasons for others. In fact, it is unclear 
what it could even mean to hold a belief in order to secure a normative 
change. The attitude of belief looks like the wrong kind of thing to be 
the exercise of a normative power, and so believing that p, even though 
it might be rationally treated as providing pre-emptive reasons, cannot 
itself be an exercise of authority.
One might object that Raz himself claims that the intention to secure 
a normative change is not necessary for exercising a normative power.
Normally only acts done with the intention of producing relevant 
normative change are recognized as producing it. But this is not always 
the case, and there are many exceptions particularly in the law or other 
institutionalized normative systems. One may make a binding contract 
without realizing that one did, for example. For this reason, the definition 
[of normative power] turns, not on the intentions with which the act 
is performed, but rather on the reasons for regarding it as effecting 
a normative change. (Raz 1999: 104)
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If I  understand him, what Raz is here claiming is that the exercise of 
a normative power should be understood not in terms of the intentions 
of the person or institution exercising the power on the particular 
occasion but rather in terms of what justifies us in taking what the 
person or institution does to be an  exercise of such a  power. On the 
surface, this sounds congenial to Zagzebski’s position. After all, she offers 
several epistemic parallels to Raz’s Normal Justification Thesis showing 
that epistemic authority can be justified for us in much the same way 
as practical authority. Raz’s Normal Justification Thesis states that ‘the 
normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person 
involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply 
with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative 
directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as 
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to 
follow the reasons which apply to him directly’ (Raz 1986: 53). Zagzebski 
offers two parallel justification theses for the authority of belief, the 
second of which states that ‘the authority of another person’s belief for me 
is justified by my conscientious judgment that I am more likely to form 
a belief that survives my conscientious self-reflection if I believe what 
the authority believes than if I try to figure out what to believe myself ’ 
(Zagzebski 2012: 110-111). As I understand it, however, Raz’s Normal 
Justification Thesis simply assumes that we have in view an attempted 
exercise of a normative power, an attempt to give pre-emptive reasons. 
The question that the Normal Justification Thesis is meant to answer is 
the question of what makes such an attempt successful, one that succeeds 
in giving the kind of reason that it purports to give.6 It is an  account 
of what makes an authority legitimate. The Normal Justification Thesis 
does not answer the question of what justifies us in taking something 
to be an attempted exercise of a normative power. Raz’s answer to this 
question lies in his definition of normative power. We are justified in 
taking something to be an  attempted exercise of a  normative power 
only if it is an act of a type that, if recognized as effecting a normative 
change, acts of this type will be generally performed only if the persons 
concerned want to secure this normative change.
In this respect, the reason that one can make a  binding contract 
without realizing it or intending to do so is that one can perform 
actions, such as signing a document, that are of a type that, if recognized 
6 See, for example, Raz (1986: 53).
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as effecting a  normative change, acts of this type will be generally 
performed only if the persons concerned intend to so bind themselves. 
So while a particular person’s intending to secure a normative change 
isn’t necessary for the exercise of a  normative power on a  particular 
occasion, for such an exercise to count as such it must be of a type that 
is recognized as being generally performed only if the persons involved 
want to secure this change. Beliefs are simply not of this type. So while 
we might have good reason to treat the beliefs of others as pre-emptive 
reasons for belief, particularly when Zagzebski’s Justification Theses for 
the Authority of Belief are satisfied, if authority is a  normative power 
to generate pre-emptive reasons for others, it looks like there can be no 
authority of belief.
III. PRE-EMPTIVE REASONS FOR BELIEF
This problem concerning the notion of normative power does not tell 
against Zagzebski’s account in Chapter 6 of the authority of testimony. 
In contrast to the case of the authority of belief, we can easily formulate 
a pre-emption thesis for the authority of testimony that parallels Raz’s 
pre-emption thesis for practical authority:
The fact that an authority tells me that p is a reason for me to believe 
that p that replaces my other reasons relevant to believing that p and is 
not simply added to them.
Just as telling an audience to Φ is a speech act that purports to give the 
audience a pre-emptive reason to Φ, so telling an audience that p can 
be construed as a speech act that purports to give the audience a pre-
emptive reason to believe that p. If the case of my neighbour is modified 
such that it involves her telling me that such and such is the thing to 
do in my garden, and if Zagzebski’s case of the pedestrians is modified 
such that it involves their telling me the location of the lecture, then it 
seems much more plausible that we have in view cases in which I might 
believe these things on the authority of the relevant speakers. In telling 
me that such and such is the case, the relevant speakers can be construed 
as performing actions that satisfy Raz’s conditions on the exercise of 
a  normative power, actions of a  type that, if recognized as effecting 
a normative change, acts of this type will be generally performed only if 
the persons concerned want to secure this normative change. And as we 
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have seen, Raz himself seems to accept that such authoritative testimony 
can meet the general conditions of his service conception of authority.
Still, I  would like to raise a  further problem for this account, one 
concerning the notion of pre-emption itself. Raz provides a  fairly 
detailed account of the nature of pre-emptive reasons, and I worry that 
these details make it difficult to see how there can be such a  thing as 
a pre-emptive epistemic reason.
For Raz, pre-emptive reasons are a species of what he calls second-
order reasons. The point of introducing this category of second-order 
reasons is to illuminate differences in the kinds of conflict that can arise 
between reasons. While first-order reasons can defeat and outweigh one 
another, Raz holds that second-order reasons interact with other reasons 
in a quite different way. Second-order reasons are reasons to act for first-
order reasons or to refrain from acting for first-order reasons (1999: 39). 
Second-order reasons do not affect the strength of first-order reasons. 
Rather, they determine whether certain first-order reasons are to be 
acted upon, and as such they cannot be simply added to the balance of 
first-order reasons. This is what it means to say that second-order reasons 
replace other reasons. Raz calls negative second-order reasons, reasons 
for refraining from acting for certain first-order reasons, exclusionary or 
pre-emptive reasons. Pre-emptive reasons serve to exclude or pre-empt 
other reasons by being reasons for not acting for these other reasons.
In addition to their pre-emptive nature, the reasons for action 
provided by authoritative directives are themselves first-order reasons 
for performing the root action. An authority’s ordering me to Φ is for me 
both a first-order reason to Φ and a second-order reason not to act for 
certain other conflicting reasons. In this respect, the pre-emptive nature 
of an  authoritative directive serves to ‘protect’ the first-order reason 
provided by the directive itself. Raz calls reasons that are both first-order 
reasons and second-order exclusionary or pre-emptive reasons protected 
reasons (1979: 18).
Second-order reasons are not simply reasons for performing or 
refraining from performing the root action. If they were, then they 
wouldn’t be adequately distinguished from first-order reasons. What 
makes second-order reasons second-order is that they are reasons 
for performing a  kind of higher-order action, the action of acting for 
a reason or intentionally refraining from acting for a reason.
There is one important point to bear in mind concerning second-order 
reasons: They are reasons for action, the actions concerned being acting 
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for a reason and not acting for a reason. If P is a reason to Φ then acting 
for the reason that P is Φ-ing for the reason that P. Not acting for P is not 
Φ-ing for the reason that P. (Raz 1979: 17)
If I  understand him correctly, Raz takes Φ-ing for the reason that 
P and intentionally refraining from Φ-ing for the reason that P to be 
themselves actions, call them acts of Ψ-ing. We might thus call Ψ-ing 
a  second-order action. Ψ-ing is the second-order action of Φ-ing for 
a reason or refraining from Φ-ing for a reason. Pre-emptive reasons are 
thus reasons for Ψ-ing, where to Ψ is to refrain from Φ-ing for certain 
conflicting first-order reasons.
By construing pre-emptive reasons in this way, Raz is in a position 
to claim, quite plausibly, that authoritative directives do not pre-empt 
subjects from considering or deliberating about the conflicting first-order 
reasons that the directive is meant to exclude. Subjects can deliberate all 
they want about such conflicting reasons. Authoritative directives are 
only meant to pre-empt subjects’ acting on the excluded reasons.7
The fact that pre-emptive reasons are reasons for what I am calling 
second-order actions puts pressure on the idea that there can be pre-
emptive reasons for belief.8 If there are pre-emptive reasons for belief, 
then presumably they are not second-order reasons for action. Instead, 
they must be second-order reasons for some kind of doxastic parallel 
to second-order actions. But is there such a  parallel? Second-order 
actions are acts of acting or refraining from acting for reasons, but is 
there anything like a higher-order doxastic state that is itself an instance 
of believing for a reason or intentionally refraining from believing for 
a reason? I cannot see that there is. Of course, there are second-order 
beliefs in the sense of beliefs that have other beliefs as their content, 
but this isn’t what we need. What we need is something that parallels 
a second-order action, an act of Ψ-ing, where to Ψ is to Φ for a reason or 
intentionally refrain from Φ-ing for a reason. Believing that p for a reason 
or refraining from believing that p for a reason is not itself an instance 
of a higher-order doxastic state. I thus don’t see how there can be such 
a thing as a doxastic parallel to second-order actions.
7 See especially the discussion in Raz (1989).
8 For doubts about the notion of pre-emptive or exclusionary reasons for action see 
Gans (1986). While I am here assuming that we can make sense of the notion of second-
order reasons for action, I suspect that some of the considerations adduced here might 
be developed in such a way as to call into question the general category of second-order 
reasons.
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Here is another way of making the same point. Consider what a reason 
for believing for a  reason or refraining from believing for a  reason 
might be. Here it will be helpful to introduce some further non-Razian 
terminology.9 Let’s take a reason to be a consideration that bears, not on 
an action or attitude, but on a question. A consideration that bears on the 
question whether to Φ, where Φ-ing is an action, is a practical reason, 
and a  consideration that bears on the question whether p, where  p is 
a proposition, is an epistemic reason. Second-order reasons for action 
can thus be construed as considerations that bear on the question 
whether to act for a reason. Insofar as Raz construes acting for a reason 
as itself a kind of action, what I’ve called a second-order act of Ψ-ing, 
the question whether to act for a reason, whether to Ψ, can be construed 
as a  question of the form whether to Φ. But what are we to make of 
second-order reasons for belief? Second-order reasons for belief would 
be considerations that bear on the question whether to believe that p for 
a reason. But what is the form of the question whether to believe that p 
for a  reason? To believe that p for a  reason is not a  proposition. The 
question whether to believe that p for a reason thus is not a question of 
the form whether p, and since it is not a question of the form whether p, 
considerations that bear on this question cannot be epistemic reasons.
The concept of second-order reasons for belief thus looks to me to be 
incoherent. If there are such reasons, then presumably they are epistemic 
reasons, considerations that bear on a question of the form whether p.10 
But I cannot see how there can be, as it were, second-order questions of 
this form. Second-order reasons for action are considerations that bear 
on the question whether to Ψ, where to Ψ is to Φ for a reason. Second-
order epistemic reasons would be considerations that bear on a question 
9 I here draw on the conception of reasons and rational agency recently defended by 
Pamela Hieronymi. See especially Hieronymi (2005) and (2006).
10 Perhaps second-order reasons for belief can be construed as practical reasons, as 
what are sometimes called ‘pragmatic’ reasons for belief. They would then be reasons 
for performing actions (including mental actions) designed to bring about believing for 
a reason or not believing for a reason. For example, a speaker’s testimony that p might be 
construed as both a first-order epistemic reason for believing that p and a practical reason 
for acting in ways designed to, say, prevent one from failing to believe that p for certain 
other conflicting reasons. On such a construal, however, I don’t think we have something 
that is aptly construed as a second-order reason. Instead, we have a consideration that 
is both a first-order epistemic reason and a first-order practical reason. This amounts 
to a  serious departure from the official Razian account of authority. Moreover, while 
I cannot consider such a proposal in any detail here, I doubt that it will yield a plausible 
conception of the nature of epistemic authority.
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of the form whether p, where p was itself something like believing 
for a  reason. But believing for a  reason isn’t a proposition. I  therefore 
tentatively conclude that, insofar as pre-emptive reasons for belief are 
supposed to be second-order epistemic reasons, there can be no pre-
emptive reasons for belief.
Raz has a  quite detailed conception of the nature of pre-emptive 
reasons. I have argued, pace Raz himself, that these details do not leave 
room for pre-emptive reasons for belief. Notably, however, Zagzebski 
does not discuss many of the details of the Razian conception of pre-
emption, including the notion of second-order reasons that I have relied 
upon heavily here, so perhaps she has a slightly different conception of 
pre-emption in mind. I have said nothing about a non-Razian distinction 
that Zagzebski introduces between first-person or deliberative reasons 
and third-person or theoretical reasons, and there is at least one point at 
which Zagzebski suggests that this distinction is helpful for understanding 
the way in which pre-emption works (2012: 114). Perhaps the distinction 
between deliberative and theoretical reasons can be employed so as to 
develop an alternative account of pre-emption that will make room for 
pre-emptive reasons for belief. At this point, however, I do not see how 
exactly this would go.
IV. AUTHORITIES AND INSTRUMENTS
Even if we can make sense of the notion of pre-emptive reasons for 
belief, however, I  have a  final worry. I  admit that this worry is a  bit 
amorphous, but it seems to me important. The philosophical problem 
of authority is often construed as the problem of how it can ever be 
morally or rationally justified to submit oneself to the will of another 
in the way that is characteristic of deference to authority. The general 
Razian strategy for addressing this problem, I  take it, is to argue that, 
as long as certain conditions are met, conforming to the directives of 
authorities is an indirect way of conforming to the reasons for action that 
exist anyway. As Raz has recently put it:
In postulating that authorities are legitimate only if their directives 
enable their subjects to better conform to reason, we see authority for 
what it is: not a denial of people’s capacity for rational action, but simply 
one device, one method, through the use of which people can achieve 
the goal (telos) of their capacity for rational action, albeit not through its 
direct use. (2009: 140)
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Similarly, Zagzebski argues that, while there might be occasions on which 
we value deciding for ourselves more than we value truth, believing on 
authority is an indirect means of attaining the epistemic ends of attaining 
truth and avoiding falsity. To the extent that we value getting the truth, we 
are often better off relying on epistemic authorities than we are trying to 
determine what to believe for ourselves. We thus have a straightforward 
defence of deference to epistemic authority as simply the most rational 
or epistemically conscientious thing to do.
While I think that this is all very plausible, I worry that it sidesteps 
the problem of authority rather than squarely addressing it. For 
many philosophers, the philosophical problem of authority is not 
simply a  problem concerning whether deference to authority can 
be instrumentally justified. Instead, the problem seems to concern 
whether the notion of deference to epistemic or practical authority is 
even coherent. Just as an example, consider the way in which Herbert 
Marcuse frames the issue in the introduction to his A Study on Authority:
The authority relationship, as understood in these analyses, assumes 
two essential elements in the mental attitude of he who is subject to 
authority: a  certain measure of freedom (voluntariness: recognition 
and affirmation of the bearer of authority, which is not based purely on 
coercion) and conversely, submission, the tying of will (indeed of thought 
and reason) to the authoritative will of an Other. Thus in the authority 
relationship freedom and unfreedom, autonomy and heteronomy, are 
yoked in the same concept and united in the single person of he who is 
subject. (2008: 7)
Marcuse here claims that there is a  kind of paradox involved in the 
very concept of obedience or deference to authority. Authorities aim at 
a response from their subjects that is somehow simultaneously free and 
unfree, that involves freely willing to not will for oneself or freely judging 
to not judge for oneself. This sense of paradox in the notion of subjecting 
or submitting oneself to authority is something that gets washed out in 
both Raz and Zagzebski’s accounts. Perhaps it is appropriately washed 
out. Perhaps there is nothing here but confusion. But it seems to me 
that there is something correct and important about what Marcuse, like 
many others, is gesturing at.11 The question is how to understand it.
11 Similar sentiments are expressed by philosophical anarchists like Godwin (1971) 
and Wolff (1970) and by defenders of authority like Arendt (1954).
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On the general Razian view, I take it that the notion of pre-emption 
is supposed to capture whatever sense there is in the idea that deference 
to authority involves subjecting or submitting oneself to another.12 On 
Zagzebski’s epistemic version of this view, epistemic authorities provide 
reasons that replace my other reasons relevant to believing. In believing 
that p on the authority of someone else, I am subjecting myself to the 
judgment of the other in that I am believing that p pre-emptively. The 
problem, however, is that on both Raz and Zagzebski’s accounts, it can 
look like pre-emption comes rather easily. A reason is pre-emptive just 
so long as it is one that excludes a belief or action being based on certain 
other conflicting reasons. In this respect, lots of considerations might 
amount to pre-emptive reasons. For Raz, not only authoritative directives 
but other kinds of mandatory rules, promises, and even decisions provide 
pre-emptive reasons. We’ve seen that one might be justified in treating 
a speaker’s request or advice as a pre-emptive reason for action, and it 
seems that we might also be justified in treating things like the readings of 
ordinary instruments pre-emptively. At the end of Chapter 5, Zagzebski 
writes that her account of the authority of belief ‘applies to inanimate 
objects like GPS systems, thermometers, and other instruments’ (2012: 
119). A thermometer might thus provide pre-emptive reasons for belief 
concerning the temperature in the room, and a car’s GPS device might 
provide pre-emptive practical reasons for taking the next exit.
I  doubt that Raz would be willing to count such instruments as 
authorities. If authority is construed as a  normative power to give or 
generate for others pre-emptive reasons, and if normative powers are 
defined in roughly the way that Raz defines them, as requiring the 
performance of an intentional action, then it will look like only agents 
can be genuine authorities.13 Still, it isn’t clear from Raz’s account why 
exactly agency matters here. His defence of authority focuses on the way 
in which pre-emption is a means of maximizing conformity with reason, 
and this defence doesn’t appeal to anything explicitly agential. The 
considerations that he claims provide pre-emptive reasons are intentional 
actions, but it isn’t clear why they need be. In a  way, this contributes 
to the strength of the Razian defence of authority. Authority looks no 
12 See, for example, Raz’s claim that the philosophical anarchist simply overlooks the 
possibility of the existence of second-order reasons (1979: 27).
13 Perhaps instruments can be construed as having a kind of authority that is derived 
from the authority of their designers, but then it looks like we need a distinction between 
original and derived authority.
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more morally or rationally problematic than any other indirect means of 
securing conformity with reason, but at the same time, I worry that we’ve 
lost touch with what was supposed to be so distinctive, and distinctively 
worrying, about authority. The paradoxical nature of authority pointed 
to by writers like Marcuse seems fundamentally to do with the notion of 
freely submitting oneself to another agent.
Consider in this respect what distinguishes our reliance on 
instruments from our reliance on practical and epistemic authorities. In 
the case of instruments that provide reasons for action, like, for example, 
a  car’s GPS device, we are often justified in treating what the device 
indicates as a reason for action. We might even be justified in treating 
what the device indicates as a pre-emptive reason, as a reason that is not 
simply added to the balance of reasons but that actually excludes certain 
other conflicting reasons. Even if we treat what the device indicates 
pre-emptively, however, we are not obeying the device (though we might 
sometimes choose to talk in this way). We are not treating the device as 
we would another person whom we recognize as being in a position to 
settle for us the question what to do. We are not subjecting our wills to 
the device, and it is this subjection to others that renders authority both 
distinctive and distinctively problematic.
This suggests that the distinctiveness of authority cannot be explained 
in terms of pre-emption alone, in the way that Raz tends to explain it. 
If ordinary instruments can provide pre-emptive reasons, as Zagzebski 
suggests, and if in treating them pre-emptively we are not subjecting 
our wills to the instrument in the way that obedience to authority 
involves subjecting our will to the authority, then the distinctiveness of 
authoritative directives cannot consist in their pre-emptive nature alone.
This is a general worry about the sufficiency of the Razian account of 
authority, but it has a more specific application in the case of epistemic 
authority. I have suggested that the difference between the indications 
of a  practical instrument like a  car’s GPS device and the directives of 
legitimate practical authorities is that the latter purport to settle practical 
questions for us, thereby subjecting us to their wills, in a way that the 
former do not. The notion of authorities settling questions for us is, of 
course, in need of further explanation, but I  have suggested that pre-
emption alone might be insufficient to explain it. If we turn to the case 
of epistemic authority, however, one might wonder whether this notion 
even applies. There is, I think, a pretty clear intuitive distinction between 
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following the directions of a GPS device and obeying the directives of 
a legitimate practical authority, but one might wonder whether there is 
such a clear distinction between, for example, believing the readings of 
a  thermometer and believing the testimony of a  climate scientist. We 
might treat both pre-emptively, but does believing the testimony of the 
climate scientist really involve submitting ourselves to the scientist in 
a way that believing the readings of a thermometer does not? If not, then 
it isn’t clear that testimony involves a  kind of authority that robustly 
parallels practical authority.
Zagzebski seems to think that there is a  genuine sense in which 
testimony, like authoritative practical directives, purports to settle 
theoretical questions for us in a  way that involves our submitting 
ourselves to the authority. At the beginning of Chapter 6, she argues that 
the authority of testimony brings with it an interpersonal dimension that 
is lacking in the case of the authority of belief. The speech act of telling 
an audience that p differs from other speech acts that aim to influence the 
beliefs of others in that telling involves an assumption of responsibility 
on the part of the speaker for the conscientiousness of the audience’s 
belief.
Telling is a  two-way street. The teller asks for trust and counts on the 
recipient to trust her. In return, she assumes the responsibility that goes 
with that trust, taking upon herself the epistemic burden of believing in 
a conscientious fashion, and doing so not only for herself, but for the 
recipient. (Zagzebski 2012: 124)
In telling an audience that p, a speaker aims for the audience to believe 
her that p, to believe that p on the speaker’s authority, where this involves 
the audience’s ceding to the speaker at least partial responsibility for 
the conscientiousness of her belief. Perhaps something similar is true 
of practical authority. In telling an  audience to Φ, a  speaker aims for 
the audience to obey her, where this involves the audience’s ceding to 
the speaker at least partial responsibility for the appropriateness of her 
action, for her Φ-ing being the thing to do in the situation. In this way, 
believing that p on the authority of a  speaker might be construed as 
allowing the speaker to settle for one the question whether p in a way that 
parallels that in which obeying a speaker’s command involves allowing 
the speaker to settle for one the question what to do. The notion of 
an authority’s settling questions for others and thereby subjecting others 
to her will or judgment is here cashed out in terms of the responsibility 
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that the authority assumes, and the subject cedes to the authority, for the 
conscientiousness of the audience’s belief or action.
Such an  account of the parallel between theoretical and practical 
authority has several virtues. First, it succeeds, I think, in distinguishing 
obedience or deference to authority from reliance on ordinary 
instruments. Responsibility for belief and action can only be distributed 
between beings capable of such, between agents. Even if we treat the 
readings of an  instrument pre-emptively, we are not thereby ceding 
responsibility for our belief or action to the instrument. Second, and 
relatedly, this account appears to be in a better position than the general 
Razian position to make sense of the paradox of authority depicted in 
the passage from Marcuse. On the general Razian view, pre-emption 
is an  indirect means of maximizing conformity to reason. On the 
alternative outlined here, however, authority has a  distinctive impact 
on the agency of others. Authorities purport to take over for others 
the activity of settling theoretical and practical questions, and while 
this might very well have the effect of maximizing others’ conformity 
to reasons, one might worry that taking over aspects of others’ agential 
activity remains an affront to their status as rational agents. Third, this 
account of the parallel between epistemic and practical authority avoids 
the problem that I have raised concerning the application of the notion 
of pre-emption to the realm of belief. As far as I can see, there is nothing 
standing in the way of thinking that responsibility for belief (assuming, 
I think plausibly, that there is such a thing) can be distributed between 
authority and subject in a way that parallels that in which responsibility 
for action can be so distributed. As such, this account makes room for 
a robust parallel between epistemic and practical authority.
Zagzebski’s claims concerning the interpersonal dimension of the 
authority of testimony do not help to solve the problem that I  have 
raised concerning the authority of belief. It is hard to see how either 
the case of my neighbour or Zagzebski’s case of the pedestrians involve 
the interpersonal ceding and accepting of responsibility involved in 
an authority’s settling for another a  theoretical question. Nevertheless, 
I  think that they do go some distance towards solving the other two 
problems that I have raised. They do so, however, only by going beyond 
the official Razian framework for understanding authority. They are 
consistent with the idea that authority is, at least in part, a normative 
power to give pre-emptive reasons, but the appeal to pre-emption 
doesn’t itself explain these interpersonal features. If this is right, then 
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the interpersonal dimension of authority might be something that needs 
to feature more centrally in our understanding of both epistemic and 
practical authority.
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